Security reforms key to prevent terror attacks

Security reforms key to prevent terror attacks

Prakash Singh(I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN MY VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE IN THIS BLOG AT LENGTH EARLIER...THESE ARE EXPERTS RECENT VIEWS AFTER RECENT ATTACK IN MUMBAI IN DETAIL...MANY POINTS ARE SIMILAR WHAT EVEN I HAVE WRITTEN WITH MY COMMON SENSE...VT)

Last Updated : 17 Jul 2011 12:54:27 AM IST

Mumbai has been struck once again. People are naturally angry. It is true that post-26/11, the government took a number of steps to strengthen the police and reinforce its counter-terrorism architecture. NSG hubs were established. Counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism schools were opened. Coastal security was beefed up. The Multi-Agency Centre was activated. Intelligence Bureau was asked to augment its strength. Paramilitary forces were sanctioned additional battalions. The state governments were asked to increase the strength of their police forces.

The policy-makers, however, have yet to appreciate that the key to police functioning lies in the police station. The thana staff is the first responder to any development—be it a terrorist attack, a Maoist ambush, or a communal outbreak. Preventive action depends largely on their efficiency, whether they have their ears to the ground and contacts at the right places. But a random visit to this basic unit would show how neglected the department is—under-staffed, under-equipped, and without enough resources to cope with the challenges of the present times.

The state governments have been derelict in modernising police forces. The funds allotted are either not fully utilised or diverted for other purposes. The state satraps have always looked upon this department as one to promote their political interests. The local MLA or MP invariably insists on having a man of his choice as the station officer, who obliges the politician, and the politician obliges him in return. This is where the nexus begins.

On September 22, 2006, the Supreme Court ordered the setting up of three institutions at the state level with a view to insulate the police from extraneous influences and to give it functional autonomy. These institutions are:

State Security Commission: to lay down broad policies and give directions for the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions of the police;

Police Establishment Board: to decide all postings, promotions and other service-related matters of officers of and below the rank of DSP, and make recommendations regarding the postings and transfers of officers of the rank of SP and above; and

Police Complaints Authority at the district and state levels with a view to inquire into allegations of serious misconduct by the police personnel.

Besides, the court ordered that the DGP shall be selected by the state from among the three senior-most officers who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the UPSC, and that he shall have a minimum tenure of two years. Police officers on operational duties in the field like the IG Zone, DIG Range, SP i/c District and SHO i/c Police Station would also have a minimum tenure of two years. The court also ordered the separation of investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people. The Union Government was asked to set up a National Security Commission for the selection and placement of heads of Central Police Organisations, upgrading their effectiveness and improving the service conditions of the personnel.

The aforesaid orders were to be implemented by the end of 2006, but little has been done. The Thomas Committee, appointed to monitor the progress, said “practically no state has fully complied with those directives so far, in letter and spirit” and expressed its “dismay over the total indifference to the issue of reforms in the functioning of police being exhibited by the states”. The institutional mechanisms have not been put in place, and if at all, these have been packed with government nominees. Some states have passed laws ostensibly in compliance of court’s directions, but actually to legitimise the status quo and circumvent the compliance of Supreme Court’s directions. The Bihar Police Act is particularly perverse.

The Centre has also been slow in implementing the court’s directions. It has been dragging its feet over the Delhi Police Bill, which could have been a model for others. Chief Justice Kapadia has made it clear that the court was going to ensure the implementation, and stated categorically that “the orders would not remain in a limbo”. It is time that the court wields the whip against the states which have defied implementation of its orders.

The battle against terrorism, or Maoism, can be won if the governments, both Central and state, carry out essential police reforms, particularly at the thana level. Is the police station adequately staffed and equipped? Do policemen have adequate transport and communications? Are they properly trained? Do they have adequate forensic support? Are they free from extraneous pressures? If the answers to the above questions are in affirmative, the battle would be more than half won. Governments have so far paid attention mostly to dressing the top layers of the police. It is time they now think of the foot soldier, the beat constable and the thana—the fulcrum around which all police operations revolve.

The writer is a former police chief of Assam and Uttar Pradesh