The “retribution” plan of the US is more hope than policy. Has India even thought of one?-30/9/10

The “retribution” plan

The “retribution” plan of the US is more hope than policy. Has India even thought of one?

Bob Woodward, in his latest book Obama’s Wars, lets us in on the US plan, in case of a successful terror strike, with Pakistani connections, on the US mainland.
If, God forbid, the SUV had blown up in Times Square, [US NSA] Jones told [Pakistan President] Zardari, we wouldn’t be having this conversation. Should a future attempt be successful, Obama would be forced to do things that Pakistan would not like. “No one will be able to stop the response and consequences,” the security adviser said. “This is not a threat, just a statement of political fact.”
Jones did not give specifics about what he meant. The Obama administration had a “retribution” plan, one of the most sensitive and secretive of all military contingencies. The plan called for bombing about 150 identified terrorist camps in a brutal, punishing attack inside Pakistan.[WaPo]
Just a very simple doubt. If the US has a plan for attacking “150 identified terrorist camps” inside Pakistan, why should it wait for a successful terror attack on the US mainland to execute that plan. A pre-emptive strike on these camps would be a far more prudent option.
There seem to be two constraining factors at play here. One is the nuclear capability that Pakistan possesses and the danger of jehadi organisations getting a hand on them amidst the chaos. But then the US must be having a plan to take care of these nukes, as has been reported earlier, in case things really start to go wrong in Pakistan. In any case, securing the Pakistani nukes would have to be done coterminous with the US plans to bomb 150 terrorist camps, whether before or after a terror strike on the US mainland.
The second factor is the domestic US support for the war. With the US economy still struggling to recover, there is little appetite in the US for expanding the War in AfPak. In fact, extracts from Woodward’s book have made it amply clear that domestic political considerations were the major driving factor behind Obama’s AfPak strategy. While a pre-emptive execution of “retribution” plan may lend Obama vulnerable to the charges of expanding the war and messing it up, a spectacular — “brutal, punishing attack inside Pakistan” — after a terror strike inside the US would galvanise domestic political support behind the President. Because that is what happened with President Bush after 9/11. But there is a significant difference here. The US was not at war with the jehadis before 9/11 and no one expected a pre-emptive action to prevent a terror strike. However now, when the US is aware of the existence of 150 terrorist camps which are continuously plotting to attack the US mainland, it is imperative upon the US to destroy them before the jehadis can succeed in their nefarious designs. By the time President Obama realises this difference, it will already be too late for him to make amends.
Going by the evidence on display so far though, we will continue to witness more of the status quo in the US policy towards Pakistan: a lots of carrots in the shape of development and military aid, some behind-the-scenes threats like the one NSA Jones delivered, and continued use of drones — and perhaps even more air power — inside tribal areas against the jehadi groups like the Haqqanis, which are a part of Pakistan army’s hedging strategy in Afghanistan. And all in the hope that somehow this will force the Pakistan army — provided it has the intent, the will and the capacity — to keep its jehadi proxies in check and stall a terror attack on the US mainland. But as that old cliché goes: Hope is not policy.
A parting thought: US has a “retribution” plan in place in case a terror strike with Pakistani connection occurs on the US mainland. What plan does India have in place in case of such an eventuality? It might be time to pay heed to the recent words of the former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill:
“Threatened military reprisal, this grand strategy would make it unambiguously clear to the Pakistan military that if another iconic Indian target is attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan that the Indian military would destroy important Pakistan military assets. I stress that, not bomb empty terrorist camps but attack Pakistan military assets.” [ANI]
Even though it seems too much to ask for today, it is a reality that India will have to confront sooner, rather than later. Looking nice, reasonable and responsible to the world be damned, let us begin with boldly articulating India’s “retribution” plan now.
PS (30/09) – This actually exemplifies what I tweeted today as the defining motto of US policy towards Pakistan: “We will cross the bridge once it collapses.”

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29 Sep 2010 | Concerning India, International relations, Military, National security, Pakistan, South Asia, Terrorism, United States