The CPMF conundrum-With this deployment of the CPMFs, where is the time for them to train and rest?

The CPMF conundrum

With this deployment of the CPMFs, where is the time for them to train and rest?

From the Report Card of the Ministry of Home Affairs for the month of September 2010 presented by the Union Home Minister:

In anticipation of the judgment, 52 coys of CPMFs were deployed to Uttar Pradesh, including 40 CRPF and 12 RAF coys. CPMF coys were also deployed in other States. A separate pool of coys has been kept in reserve for any emergency. The IAF is on standby to rush CPMF/Army personnel to trouble spots, if required.
The security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games were reviewed from time to time. 50 CPMFs coys have been deployed for the Games, including 7 BSF, 6 CRPF, 12 CISF, 11 IRB and 14 SAP coys. Later today, Government will make a detailed statement as well as issue an Advisory on the security arrangements for the benefit of the ticketholders, invitees and the general public.
450 CPMF coys have been deployed for the Bihar assembly elections due in October-November, 2010. These include 70 CRPF, 90 BSF, 90 CISF, 30 ITBP, 40 RPF, 30 SSB and 100 IRB/SAP coys.[PIB]
Besides these, there are CPMF companies deployed in Jammu & Kashmir, North Eastern states and in the anti-Maoist operations. The BSF and the ITBP are also tasked to guard India’s International border with its neighbours.
The standard rule for all forces is to have one-third of its troopers deployed in operations, one-third in training and one-third in rest, preparing for the next deployment. With the kind of deployment that these CPMF have, where is the time for them to train and rest adequately?
This question must be seen in the context of the propensity of Indian media and its experts to blame the CPMFs for their lack of professionalism, whether operating against the violent stone-pelting mobs in Kashmir or while fighting the deadly Maoist insurgency.
The obvious solution to the problem seems rather simple: increase their numbers so that there exists a cushion to deploy adequately trained and properly invigorated troopers for operational duties. However this may perhaps not be the complete truth. This shortage of CPMFs has exacerbated because the states, while having law and order as a subject under their charter, have created no reserve capacity in their police forces. Even when the reserve police units exist in the states, they are poorly trained, ill-equipped and often found unequal to the tasks assigned to them. This has led to the situation where the state governments do not trust their state reserve forces and seek increasingly greater number of CPMFs to deal with any security situation. In today’s political climate, it is often impossible for the centre to deny any request from the state for such assistance, its impact on the overall health of the CPMFs notwithstanding.
The solution lies in asking the state governments to allocate a certain number of state reserve police units for a central pool, where they should be deployed on centre’s direction. Alternatively, the centre should display enough political will to vet each requirement from the states before despatching the CPMFs. Increasing the strength of already unwieldy CPMFs must only be considered as an option of last resort.
In the meanwhile, it would be instructive to draw out the statistical data for all CPMF units over the last two decades to ascertain their periods of deployment to periods of training and periods of rest. The availability of this information may hopefully get the debate on this subject on the right track.

Of course, a far simpler way to overcome this problem is for the states to undertake police reforms. But alas, who cares for police reforms in India?