'Bridge trust deficit to resolve all differences'

'Bridge trust deficit to resolve all differences'

Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri,

Apr 30, 2010, 02.55am IST

|aman ki asha

(GOOD TO READ THAT NOW WE TWO COUNTRIES ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT 'AAR-PAAR KI LADAI AND JUST CONFIDENTIAL BUILDING MEASURES, BUT TAKEN STEPS FURTHER....GOOD WISHES TO ALL OF US...A MUST READ ARTICLE...EVEN PUBLIC OF BOTH COUNTRIES NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE CALL OF TWO NATIONS AND ITS IMPORTANCE...ITS RIGHT TIME TO BREAK THE ICE....VIBHA TAILANG)

The biggest problem between Pakistan and India currently is the absence of trust. Anything that addresses this trust deficit is, therefore, helpful. For this reason, I warmly welcome the initiative by The Times of India Group and the Jang Group of Pakistan to initiate the project ‘Aman Ki Asha’.

Media can help remove suspicions about each other.

This is all the more important because the existing suspicions and distrust about each other have been further exacerbated by irresponsible and distorted stories, carried by sections of the media in both the countries, in the first instance.

Some people in both countries may well say that, after all, both Pakistan and India are important countries and could go their own way. But it was for a good reason that former Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "You can change history but not geography” during a debate in the Lok Sabha. PM Manmohan Singh echoed similar sentiments in the Lok Sabha, where he said, "As neighbours, it is our obligation to keep our channels open. Unless we want to go to war with Pakistan, dialogue is the only way forward”. I was encouraged to note during the recent ‘Aman Ki Asha’ session in Lahore that some Indian participants said India felt the need to resolve the issue of Jammu & Kashmir inter alia for two reasons.

First, India being a democracy could not resort to force in J&K for an indefinite period,

and second, that India could achieve its real potential and play a major role on the world stage only after resolving its disputes with Pakistan.

As a lifelong politician, who has been elected a member of parliament from a constituency in central Punjab on the Indian border, and as a former foreign minister, I can say with confidence that peace with India is not only in the national interest of Pakistan but can also be sold to the people of Pakistan, provided it is peace with honour. History teaches us that’s the only lasting peace. India is a big country and may have extra-regional ambitions. As far as Pakistan is concerned, our very doctrine is one of minimum credible deterrence aimed at protecting Pakistan’s national security.

Another reason that gives me confidence is that every major political party of Pakistan supports a negotiated settlement. This implies that if India were to show flexibility, Pakistan would reciprocate similarly. In this connection it is correct that while the agreement was arrived at during our tenure in office, former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee showed leadership and courage in restarting this process in February 1999 when Vajpayee undertook his famous bus journey on the invitation of the then PM Nawaz Sharif. Similarly, Benazir Bhutto, during both her tenures, made concerted efforts to improve the relationship between the two countries. MQM, ANP and even Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, under the leadership of Maulana Fazl-ur Rehman, have supported a negotiated settlement on Kashmir.

Perhaps one reason why there is such a strong need for a negotiated solution of Kashmir is the recognition in both countries that Pakistan and India have tried everything in their power to enforce their version of a Kashmir settlement. They have fought five wars, including two minor ones in the Rann of Kutch and in Kargil. There have been various troop mobilizations, including the largest one since the World War I (Operation Parakram), in which a million soldiers remained eyeball-to-eyeball for almost a year. After nuclearization of South Asia, following tests by India and Pakistan, war between the two countries has become nearly impossible.

That being the case, it was equally clear that any solution we found would not be an ideal one from the perspective of Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Indians. It could only be the best under the circumstances. It had to be one that Kashmiris would accept, and one, that the leaderships of India and Pakistan could sell to their respective peoples whose perspectives were radically different. It would seem to many people that such a solution just cannot be found. It was precisely to find such a formula that the two leaderships directed their representatives, involved in the back channel, to remain engaged. No wonder the non-papers went to and fro innumerable times. The back-channel negotiators met in different locations in many countries to preserve the secrecy of the process. They brought the drafts to the principals in both the countries, where changes were made and sent back to the other side and so on and so forth.

It was after approximately three years of such painstaking work, which sometimes even involved changing punctuation in different drafts, that the two governments felt that they had agreed on the draft of an agreement, towards the end of 2006. They felt that on the basis of this draft they would be in a position to present an agreement to their respective constitutional authorities for their approval. It was felt that this draft would be acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis.

The major features of the draft Kashmir agreement involved gradual demilitarization as the situation improved, self-governance and a joint mechanism involving Kashmiris from both sides as well as presence of Pakistani and Indian representatives in this process. The purpose was to improve the comfort level of Kashmiris.

The joint mechanism envisaged cooperation in various fields including exploitation of water resources and hydroelectric power. Self-governance also provided maximum possible powers to Kashmiris to manage their political, economic, financial and social matters and those pertaining to economic development as well as for enhanced travel and economic interaction on both sides of the LoC. For practical purposes, as far as the Kashmiris on both sides are concerned, the border would be made irrelevant for movement of goods and people.

The agreement, though not ideal, was the best possible under the circumstances.

The agreement provided for a review after 15 years. We were aware that there would be overwhelming support for this agreement, but we also realized that there would be criticism from some sections in Kashmir, Pakistan and India. In the very nature of things, it is impossible to produce a solution which will be equally acceptable to every one. For this reason, we decided that the arrangement will need a review at the end of 15 years, during which its implementation would be monitored with great care by all the parties concerned, and in the light of the experience, this arrangement could be further improved.

Another question that people sometimes ask me in hushed tones these days, now that Pervez Musharraf is no longer in power, is whether the agreement that we have arrived at had the support of the Pakistan army. Of course, it had the support of all stakeholders. It is unthinkable that an issue of this nature could be negotiated without having all the stakeholders on board. Besides the foreign office and the presidency, the military was appropriately represented. Former president Musharraf, in response to a question whether he took his corps commanders into confidence, is on record as saying, on more than one occasion, that he used to take everyone on board. Furthermore, Pakistan army
high command is highly disciplined and sophisticated and understands clearly that national security is a very broad concept and military preparedness is only one, albeit, a very important component of it. The
concept of national security includes economic and political stability and a settlement with India on honourable terms strengthens Pakistan’s national security.

It is also pertinent to mention here that while Musharraf may not be on the scene presently, institutional thinking does not change so rapidly. Of course, for tactical reasons, adjustments are made keeping in view time and circumstance. I am aware of the current differences between Pakistan and India on Afghanistan following President Obama’s announcement regarding America’s intentions in Afghanistan. If trust deficit between the two countries can be bridged, all differences between the two countries can be resolved.

Before I conclude, I would like to welcome the statement of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani that efforts are being made through the back channel to resolve all outstanding issues with India. It is important that negotiations be resumed soon because Manmohan Singh’s government, with which we negotiated the agreement, is still in power, and the BJP, the other major national party in India, had started the process during the tenure of former PM Vajpayee. I welcome the statement of our prime minister, despite being in the opposition, because I believe that in matters of national interest one has to rise above the spirit of partisanship. I am sure Indian politicians would have a similar approach. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of detailed work has been done and we can start from where we left.

(The author was foreign minister of Pakistan under President Pervez Musharraf)